



EUROPEAN
COMMISSION

Community Research



PHYLAWS

PHYSical LAYer Wireless Security Advisory Board - Year 1 Meeting - Part E2

Telecom Paris Tech, room B603, 46 rue Barrault,
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Task T3.1: Study and development and test of “propagation dependant” random generators (M1 – M27)

Task leader: ICL Task contributors: TPT, TCS

• Objectives

- use the radio channel randomness between two legitimate users to generate secrecy
- use this secrecy in secret key generation (or initial vectors)

• Major issues

- size of the generated key
- degree of secrecy
- methods for secret key agreement

• Key parameters and use cases

- frequency and band width
- number of antennas at Bob-Alice-Eve
- time variability
- richness of the radio channel
- spatial separation between Alice-Bob & Eve

• Interactions with other tasks

- T4.1 New RATs based on SISO, MISO and MIMO technologies
- T5.1 CIR measurement and modeling

Task T3.1: following...

- **Work plan**
 - develop a simulation tool to evaluate the secrecy capacity
 - based on a discrete multipath channel model
 - enabling SISO, MISO, MIMO schemes
 - allowing any antenna pattern characteristics
 - consider “realistic“ site specific channel models (ray-tracing with digital maps)
 - investigate measured channels (also linked with WP5)
- **1st year’s work**
 - assessment of the SoA
 - 1st version of a simulation tool, based on a circular disc model of scatterers
 - analysis of the relevance of the concept of secrecy capacity vs. the knowledge available to Eve

How to compute the mutual information?

If

- $h_a \sim CN(0, R_A)$
- $h_{a'} \sim CN(0, R_{A'})$
- $h_c \sim CN(0, R_C)$
- $h_b \sim CN(0, R_B)$




- $I_K = I(h_a, h_{a'}) = \log_2 \frac{|R_A||R_{A'}|}{|R_{AA'}|}$
- $I_{SK} = I(h_a, h_{a'}/h_c, h_b) = \log_2 \frac{|R_{ABC}||R_{A'BC}|}{|R_{BC}||R_{AA'BC}|}$
- $I_{VK} = I_K - I_{SK}$

Else

- *Complicated*

A geometry-based channel model where scatterers are uniformly distributed within a disc

- Assumptions:
 - Directivity at Bob level
 - Omnidirectional antennas
 - Non LOS propagation
 - Omnidirectional scatterers




General considerations

- I_K, I_{SK} and $I_{VK} = I_K - I_{SK}$ are statistical quantities
 - The need to define the statistical set
- The channels statistics depending on the terminals knowledge about their environment
 - Knowledge → Scenario parameters
 - Lack of knowledge → Large statistical set
- The information owned by the triplet Alice-Bob-Eve determines the relevant statistical sets
 - The resulting randomness impacts the degree of secrecy

General considerations



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Knowledge: large number of I_{VK}

Lack of knowledge: small number of I_{VK}

Scenarios

Scenario 1: Nearly perfect environment knowledge

- Channel estimation based on:
 - The knowledge of the departure angle
 - The knowledge of scatterers locations
- A Gaussian behavior
- A non realistic scenario


Scenario 2: No information

- No information about the environment is available for Alice/Eve
 - Statistically definition of all the parameters
- Non Gaussian behavior
- A realistic scenario

Scenarios

- Hypothesis: The mean of I_K computed in the scenario 1 corresponds to a single value computed in the realistic scenario 2

Parameter	Value
The frequency	2 GHz
The disc radius	100λ
SNR	15 dB
Scatterers number	10




- $SNR = \frac{E\{\|h\|_F^2\}}{\sigma^2}$
 - $\|\cdot\|_F$: The Frobenius norm
 - σ^2 : The mean power of the noise

Scenarios

- Various environment → several values of I_K
- For SISO, I_K depends only on the SNR:

$$I_K = \log_2 \left(1 + \frac{SNR^2}{1 + 2 SNR} \right)$$





SNR	I_K (bits)
15 dB	4.05
20 dB	5.67
25 dB	7.31

Security condition: randomness

- Two cases for the complex amplitude β_l
 - Rayleigh fix: The same scattering coefficients for all scatterers
 - Rayleigh β : We assume that scattered waves exhibit random Rayleigh fading towards Alice/Eve


Security condition: randomness

- β fix: Almost all the bits are vulnerable
- β Rayleigh: More variability and more secrecy



Security condition: randomness

- More complexity for eavesdropping when the diversity increases with the number of scatterers



Interactive discussion of partners with Advisory Board members

See deliverable D.1.12
“Advisory Board Year 1 Meeting Report”